Introduction
For decades, states merge small and medium sized municipalities to achieve economies of scale in expenditures (Fox and Gurley 2006 , Holzer et al. 2009 , Bird and Slack 2013 . The empirical evidence however is at least mixed. Reingewertz (2012) , Blom-Hansen et al. (2014) , and Hansen et al. (2014) document that expenditures of merged municipalities in Israel and Denmark decreased. By contrast, Lüchinger and Stutzer (2002) and Fritz (2013) show that merged municipalities in Switzerland and South Germany increased expenditures. Moisio and Uusitalo (2013) and Allers and Geertsema (2016) do not find any significant effect of municipal reforms on public expenditures in Finland and in the Netherlands. Blesse and Baskaran (2016) do neither find effects of voluntary nor of compulsory mergers on overall, administrative and personnel expenditures in merged East German municipalities. 1 Against the background of the evidence on consolidations of small entities, little is known to which extent mergers of large local governments affect public expenditures. However, politicians debate in many countries whether to merge county-sized administrations, for example, in Germany, the United States, Austria, or Ireland.
2 I examine the effects of mergers of large local governments covering more than 100,000 inhabitants on average. In 2008, the state government of the German state of Saxony reduced the number of districts (upper-level local governments) from 22 to 10 (see Figure 1) . The average population of Saxon districts increased substantially 1 Blesse and Baskaran (2016) however show that compulsory municipal mergers reduced administrative expenditures, which however are only a minor share of overall municipal expenditures. 2 See, e.g., Germany: Thüringer Allgemeine, "Thüringen und Brandenburg prüfen Kooperation beim Umsetzen der Verwaltungs-und Gebietsreform", 15.07.2016 4 There are studies on consolidations of special-purpose entities such as school districts. For the seminal work see Brasington (1999) . Further evidence is provided, e.g., by Duncombe and Yinger (2007) , and Knight and Gordon (2008) .
Prior studies usually compare merged and unchanged local governments within a differencein-differences setup. I abstract from micro-level data and apply the synthetic control method to state-level aggregates. The synthetic control method is a powerful tool to evaluate policy reforms if the number of treated units is small, and only aggregated outcomes are observable (see also Abadie et al. 2015) . I show that the method is superior to difference-in-differences estimations, when the common trend assumption seems to be violated (see also Kreif et al. 2016) .
Only a small number of studies in public finance employed the synthetic control method (e.g., Mukherji and Mukhopadhyay 2011 , Koehler and König 2015 , Falkenhall et al. 2015 , Green et al. 2016 . 5 As the most related study, Hämäläinen and Moisio (2015) use the synthetic control method to evaluate the implementation of a second layer of local government in one region in
Finland while other regions do not change institutions. Hämäläinen and Moisio (2015) do neither report cost savings nor increases in expenditures, which is also in line with the results of this study.
Institutional background

Districts in Germany
Germany has a federal system with two layers of state government (national level, state level) and two layers of local government (districts, municipalities). The about 10,000 German municipalities (Gemeinden) are responsible for local public services such as public safety and order, waste disposal or cultural institutions and can set their own tax rates on property and local business. The 295 districts (Landkreise) constitute the upper-level local governments and roughly correspond with US counties in terms of population. Districts are mainly responsible 5 Most public economics studies using the synthetic control method evaluate regulations of tobacco (Abadie et al. 2010 , Bharadwaj et al. 2014 ) and alcohol (Marcus and Siedler 2015 Baskaran 2014) . In 2013, the share of municipalities' fiscal capacity transferred to the district level (i.e., the contribution rate) varied between 30% and 70% across federal states.
District mergers 2008 in Saxony
In Germany, the number of municipalities decrease year by year due to voluntary and compulsory mergers. District mergers, by contrast, are rare. There have been waves of district mergers in West Germany in the 1970s, and in East Germany in the 1990s after re-unification (see Figure   2 ). In 1994, the state of Saxony reduced the number of districts from 48 to 28. There were also 6 large cities which exercise district and municipal functions as one. 
Empirical strategy
Identification
I employ the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010 Abadie et al. ( , 2015 . The basic idea of this method is to construct a synthetic counterfactual for a treated unit by matching on the pre-treatment trend of the outcome variable of interest. The identifying assumption is that a treated unit would have evolved in the same manner as a pre-treatment close-fitting synthetic counterpart in the absence of the treatment. The counterfactual is a simple weighted average of untreated control units from a proper donor pool. The weights are derived in such a way that the pre-treatment outcome of the treated unit and the outcome of the counterfactual fits best. Technically, the pre-treatment Root Mean Square Percentage Error ( ) of the observed outcome and the counterfactual pre-treatment outcome is minimized:
( 1) where is the observed outcome of unit in pre-treatment period . ̂ is the counterfactual outcome of in period , given by a weighted average of untreated units from the donor pool:
The counterfactual weights sum up to unity and are chosen in the way that the is minimized. Further (cross-sectional) matching predictors can be used to improve the comparability of the counterfactual and the treated unit (for details see Abadie et al. 2015) . The results from the synthetic control method provide a causal interpretation if the synthetic counterfactual sufficiently follows the pre-treatment trend of the treated unit, further pre-treatment predictors match well, no further reforms were enacted, and the donor pool units were not affected by the treatment. In these assumptions are met, the method captures institutional as well as other unobservable differences. Fourth, district mergers in one state are also unlikely to have an impact on other states. There are also no reasons to believe that potential spill-overs in expenditures changed after the reform -compared to the pre-merger period.
Fifth, I can show that there is a synthetic counterpart that fits the pre-reform trend in expenditures of Saxon districts well (see Section 4.1 below).
In conclusion, the synthetic control method is well suited to study the effect of the 2008 district mergers in Saxony on expenditures. I construct "Synthetic Saxony" by adjusting pre-reform (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) Saxony as the treated unit. 17 Figure 3 gives an impression of the dataset: state aggregates of districts in 10 German states constitute the donor pool, the aggregate of Saxon districts is the treated unit.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Results
Baseline
A "Synthetic Saxony" composed of 70% of the state of Thuringia, 22% Brandenburg, and 8%
Saarland fits the Saxon pre-treatment trend in total district expenditures and further predictors best. On average, Saxony as well as "Synthetic Saxony" has total district expenditures of around 720 Euro per capita between 1998 and 2007, the unweighted sample mean (without Saxony) was 545 Euro per capita (see Table 2 ). Average district population, GDP per capita, the price level, young age dependency ratio, and voter turnout in the 2005 national election fits also well (lower panel of Table 2 ). The unemployment rate in "Synthetic Saxony" is somewhat smaller (10.7%) than in real Saxony (12.2%). The fitting procedures for the four main expenditure categories yield also comparable synthetic control units (see Section 4.2 later on). The donor pool weights for these expenditure categories are shown in Table 3 .
[ Table 2 about here] "Synthetic Saxony" fits real Saxony also from a time series perspective. [ Figure 4 about here] Table 2 , center panel, columns (1) and (2) 
Robustness
The synthetic control method does not allow to draw inferences. Therefore, I conduct different robustness tests. First, I study whether results are driven by certain donor pool units. (Figure 6, d) ). This leads also to somewhat higher post-merger expenditures in Saxony (176 Euro per capita) compared to "Synthetic Saxony" (151 Euro per capita) (see Table 2 ). In the following, I will refer to categories only that were not affected by a re-assignment of functions (categories a) to c)).
[ Figure 6 about here]
On average, expenditures for administration amounted to around 140 Euro per capita in Saxony as well as in "Synthetic Saxony" before the 2008 mergers (Table 2 , column (4)). Administrative expenditures which are a main target of district mergers however also hardly differ after the reform; Saxony exhibits mean expenditures of 158 Euro per capita, the counterfactual predicts 157 Euro per capita in the absence of the reform. Expenditures for education do also differ to only small extent: the pre-reform difference between Saxony (103 Euro per capita) and "Synthetic Saxony" (108 Euro) was 5 Euro per capita. After the reform, the difference is at 6 Euro per capita (93-87 Euro). Figure 6 may imply some cost reductions in Saxony after 2011. This, however, might also be a result of extensive school reforms in many states and of substantially lower birth rates in Saxony after re-unification.
Social expenditures as the quantitatively most important expenditure category in Saxon districts decrease by around 3% or 14 Euro per capita compared to the predicted counterfactual (see Table 2 , column (4)). However, deviations in the pre-reform trend of Saxony and "Synthetic
Saxony" in 2004 and 2007 may question whether the results for social expenditures are robust to the chosen method. Therefore, I compare synthetic control method results to OLS estimates of a simple difference-in-differences specification with year and state fixed effects:
denotes expenditures per capita which is the dependent variable. Difference-in-differences estimates for total expenditures, and for expenditures for social care fairly reproduce synthetic control method results (see Table 4 , columns (1) and (3)). The coefficient for ( × -) does not turn out to be statistically significant in these specifications. This underpins the non-findings from the synthetic control method.
[ Table 4 about here]
Results for expenditures for administration, education, and development, transport and environment (columns (2), (4), and (5)) however differ across methods. For example, difference-indifferences estimates imply a reduction in expenditures for administration of about 10 Euro per capita whereas the synthetic control group method suggests an increase in administrative expenditures of about 2 Euro per capita (see Table 4 , column (2)). Similar pattern can be found for education expenditures and, to some extent, for expenditures for development, transport and environment. In all three cases, however, the deviation is basically caused by a violation of the common trend assumption of the difference-in-differences method. The lower panel of Table 4 shows the growth rate of pre-reform district expenditures in Saxony, of "Synthetic Saxony", and of the donor pool average. In the case of administrative expenditures, expenditures per capita decreased by 8% between 1998 and 2007 in Saxony but increased by 11% on donor pool average. In "Synthetic Saxony", by contrast, administrative expenditures per capita decreased by 8% like in real Saxony. Thus, there seems to be no common trends in administrative expenditures of the donor pool average and Saxony. The same applies to education expenditures and to expenditures for development, transport and environment where difference-in-differences and synthetic control group results deviate. I conclude that the synthetic control method delivers at least similar results to the difference-in-differences method if the common trend assumption is met (total expenditures, expenditures for social care). 19 In these cases, I do not find a significant effect of mergers on expenditures. If pre-reform trends vary, the synthetic control group method is more reliable (Kreif et al. 2016) . In these cases, the difference between synthetic control group method predicted expenditures and realized expenditures, i.e., the reform effect, is fairly small for administrative expenditures (2.32 Euro per capita) and education expenditures (-1.56 Euro per capita). Altogether, results do neither indicate effects of district mergers on total expenditures nor on expenditures any main function.
Finally, one may suspect that the amalgamation of four former large cities to their surrounding districts may bias fiscal outcomes after the reform. 20 I restrict the dataset to districts which are not merged to a large city in 2008. 21 Figure 7 shows that the results do not differ from the baseline setup. Quite the contrary, the fit of real and counterfactual Saxony is even closer after 19 The study of Becker et al. (2015) is also an excellent case in this point. 20 The cities of Görlitz, Hoyerswerda, Plauen, and Zwickau were merged to the surrounding districts. 2006. Thus, no effects on expenditures can be identified even in this homogenous subsample.
Mergers of large cities therefore do not drive the results.
[ Figure 7 about here]
Conclusion
I use the synthetic control method to identify the effect of mergers of county-sized administrations on public expenditures. The results of this study do not show that mergers of large local governments covering about 100,000 inhabitants result in scale effects. The findings neither indicate decreases in total expenditures, nor in main expenditure categories. Given the substantial political costs of mergers, e.g., decreases in voter turnout (Fritz and Feld 2015) , reductions in satisfaction with the local government (Hansen 2015) , or common pool problems (Hinnerich 2009, Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2015) , net benefits of local government mergers seem to be at least very low. 22 The results of Ems (2016) indicate that political participation in Saxon district councils after the 2008 mergers suffers to some extent from increased time-consuming travel costs and complexity. Further research should elaborate on the effects of local government mergers on political participation.
23
The results of this study, however, do not allow drawing conclusions regarding efficiency. If merged districts were able generate more output using the same inputs (expenditures), gains in 22 Voluntary mergers, by contrast, may suffer from an inefficient mapping due to competition avoiding politicians. See Hyytinen et al. (2014) . Other studies discuss the effects of mergers on growth (Kauder 2016) , or on public debt (Jordahl and Liang 2010 Table 3 . Table 2 as the difference in before-after merger differences of Saxony and "Synthetic Saxony". The dependent variable is district expenditures per capita. Significance levels (Robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10.
